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Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-
Conformity in the Civil Rights Strategies of
Sexual Minorities
by
PAISLEY CURRAH*
Introduction
The organizers of this Symposium asked us to explore the legal and
social constructions of sexual orientation. Symposium Editor Sarah
Colby asked one panel, consisting of Matt Coles, Shannon Minter,
Ruthann Robson, and me, to discuss "the means and ends of the civil
rights struggle." The particular means and ends I want to address in this
Article concern the enlistment of the categories of "sex" and "gender
identity" in arguments about rights claims based on sexual orientation. If
sexual orientation is defined by sexual object choice, and if the categories
of sex and gender and the relation between them are not contested, are
equal rights claims based on sexual orientation implicitly premised on the
continuation of the state-administered binary-sex-classification system? If
so, what are the consequences, not just for lesbians and gay men, but for
bisexuals, transgendered, and transsexual people?
I want to suggest that arguments for gay, lesbian, and bisexual civil
rights must challenge not only the state's prerogative to discriminate on
the basis of sex, but also the legal construction of the relationship
between sex, gender identity, and gender expression that inheres in the
definition of sexual orientation. Ending state-sponsored discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation is unquestionably an important goal-but
so also is ending the juridical power of the state to enforce any particular
definition of sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation. In a 1979
article, Mary Dunlap made these connections explicitly, arguing that
there is a "commonality" between women, homosexuals, mothers of
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illegitimate children, and sexually reassigned persons "who have suffered
from the power of the law to prescribe sex identity, and, correlatively, to
enforce sex roles in all areas of life."1  She concluded, "If the
individual's authority to define sex identity were to replace the authority
of law to impose sex identity, many of the most difficult problems
currently associated with the power of government to probe, penalize,
and restrict basic freedoms of sexual minorities would be resolved."
2
While gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights advocates pursue the entirely
worthy goal of putting an end to particular kinds of state-sponsored
discrimination against sexual minorities, the more radical project of
replacing the state's authority to define sex and gender, articulated so
clearly by Dunlap, has sometimes been obscured. Moreover, as I will
argue in this paper, if the rights claims of lesbian and gay people rely on
the deployment of arguments, either implicit or explicit, that reinforce
hegemonic United States gender norms-including the notion that there is
a predictable, normative relationship between visible genitals, gender
identity, and gender expression-any ensuing victory might turn out to be
something of a pyrrhic one, not only for transgendered and gender-
variant people but also for those lesbian, bisexual, and gay individuals
who are not transgendered or gender-variant.
My larger project is to engage in a radical revision of the politics of
identity, of rights talk, and of the rights claims of sexual minorities in
order to develop an account of them that reinscribes neither the "identity
fundamentalisms" so prevalent among the new social movements,
including the U.S. gay and lesbian rights movement, nor the
deconstructive "identity iconoclasms" so rampant in the academy and in
queer theory in particular. Queer theorists have rightly shown that
identity-based political claims ultimately fail to undermine the very
categories-homosexuality and heterosexuality, in this case-upon which
such subjection is based. Lisa Bower, for example, calls this identity-
based civil rights project the "politics of official recognition" and
characterizes it as an attempt to "fit the 'queer other' within some space
1. Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1147 (1979).
2. Id. at 114748.
3. John D'Emilio identifies the emergence of identity politics in the 1970s, which became
"the organizing framework for oppression and... the basis for collective mobilization," as
partly responsible for the foundering of the more radical aspects of the gay liberation movement
in the U.S., a movement which originally sought to challenge the very categories upon which
gay oppression was based. The rise of the Gay Activist Alliance and the concomitant demise of
the Gay Liberation Front exemplifies this shift. JOHN D'EMILIO, MAKING TROUBLE 245
(1992).
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already acknowledged by the liberal nation-state." 4 In opposition to such
reformist "we're just like you" goals, queer theorists have focused their
attention on identity's contingency, fluidity, and constructedness, and
suggested that it is in the destabilization of identity categories that
effective political practice is to be found. Accompanying this dismissal
of identity-based politics has been the abandonment of the state as "the
site of privileged political action." 5 Instead, "cultural contestations" have
become the locus of effective political intervention.6
I want to argue, however, that the promulgation of these oppositions
between identity fundamentalism and identity iconoclasm, between state-
centered political action and interventions in the "cultural" sphere, has
sometimes had the unfortunate effect of eliding the very material
violences that people suffer from the discursive construction of the
identity categories that many queer theorists are so eager to dismantle.7
4. Lisa Bower, Queer Problems/Straight Solutions, in PLAYING WITH FIRE 267, 268-69
(Shane Phelan ed., 1997). Wendy Brown also has a cogent critique of rights discourse. See
WENDY BROWN, STATE OF INJURY 133-34 (1995).
5. For example, Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner point out that "[q]ueer theory has
flourished in the disciplines where expert service to the state has been least familiar and where
theory has consequently meant unsettlement rather than systemization." Laura Berlant &
Michael Warner, What Does Queer Theory Teach Us About X?, 110 PUBLICATION MOD.
LANGUAGES ASS'N 343, 348 (1995).
6. Discussions of the kind of cultural interventions that pose a challenge to the very
categories of gender and sex often encompass such subjects as the queering of public spaces and
undermining gender through drag performativity. But even Judith Butler has disavowed the
kind of voluntaristic notions of agency upon which these types of cultural interventions are
predicated:
Matters have been made even worse, if not more remote, by the questions raised by
the notion of gender performativity introduced in Gender Trouble. For if I were to
argue that genders are performative, that could mean that I thought that one woke in
the morning, perused the closet or some more open space for the gender of choice,
donned that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place at night.
Such a willful and instrumental subject, one who decides on its gender, is clearly not
its gender from the start and fails to realize that its existence is already decided by
gender. Certainly, such a theory would restore a figure of a choosing subject-
humanist-at the center of a project whose emphasis on construction seems to be quite
opposed to such a notion.
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER x, xi (1993). Instead, Butler suggests that we see
gender as "constitutive constraint." Id.
It may have been this over-enthusiastic reading of gender performativiy that has led some
queer theorists to construe transsexuals' desires for hormone therapy or surgery as naive.
For another discussion of the tension between structure and agency, see Anthony Appiah,
Tolerable Falsehoods: Agency and the Interests of Theory, in CONSEQUENCES OF THEORY 63,
74 (Jonathan Arac & Barbara Johnson eds., 1991).
7. Kimberl6 Crenshaw has suggested that defending the identity categories upon which
oppression is based is an important part of the strategies of subordinated groups: "At this point
in history, a strong case can be made that the most critical resistance strategy for disempowered
groups is to occupy and defend a politics of social location rather than to vacate and destroy it."
August 1997] DEFENDING GENDERS
The contingency of identity does not make it less "real" to the subjects
who experience it and who organize their lives around it, whether those
subjects' identifications are male, female, masculine, feminine, lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transsexual, transgendered, and/or non-transgendered. In
this Article, I stress the necessity of political action directed toward the
state. I also demonstrate why identity-based political claims cannot be
jettisoned before the state's prerogative to legislate the system of sex and
gender classifications has been taken away. In fact, I argue that it is
possible to articulate the two projects-the short-term project of freeing
queer identities and practices from state-sponsored discrimination and the
long-term project of ending the state's power to classify-together.
The "figures" of the transsexual and the transgender have played a
central role in queer theorists' readings of the destabilizing effects of
cultural constestations of gender categories. Yet, as Ki Namaste points
out:
In recent years, the field known as queer theory has witnessed a
veritable explosion of essays, presentations, and books on the subjects
of drag, gender, performance, and transsexuality. Yet these works
have shown very little concern for those who identify and live as drag
queens, transsexuals, and/or transgenders.... [Why] is it that
transgendered people are the chosen objects of the field of queer theory,
and why does the presentation of these issues ignore the daily realities
of transgendered people?8
Even queer theorists who do examine the state's role in producing
"proper" liberal subjects use the problems that transgender people face in
dealing with the state only to demonstrate the margins, boundaries, and
limits of a politics of identity, while failing to attend to the immediate,
material violence engendered by the situation. For example, Bower's
critique of state-directed identity politics is accompanied by a reading of
Karen Ulane's sex-based discrimination lawsuit against Eastern Airlines
(Ulane was fired after undergoing sex-change surgery). Bower uses that
case to celebrate the deconstructive possibilities of "articulating a non-
identity" in the following passage, "Granted both Ulane and Hardwick
'lost' their cases, but the legal decisions can be interpreted to suggest the
instability of sex and sexual identities and the capacity of ambiguous
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1299 (1991).
8. Ki Namaste, 'Tragic Misreadings': Queer Theory's Erasure of Transgender
Subjectivity, in QUEER STUDIES 183-84 (Brett Beemyn & Mickey Eliason eds., 1996). For
examples of the kinds of work Namaste critiques, see JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE
(1990) and BODIES THAT MATTER (1993); MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-
DRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY (1992); Carole-Anne Tyler, Boys Will Be Girls: The
Politics of Gay Drag, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 32 (Diana Fuss ed.,
1991).
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identities to create constestation in the legal field." 9 Yet Ms. Ulane
would probably not describe herself as a "non-identity." In her Title VII
complaint, she described herself simply as a woman. Moreover, she
would probably not have put quotation marks around the word "lost"
when describing the outcome of her case. Similarly, when Dee Farmer,
a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual prisoner who was beaten and
raped when placed in a federal penitentiary's male general population,
found out that she had lost her Eighth Amendment-based case, her initial
reaction was probably not that "at least" her challenge constituted a blow
to the hegemonic system of gender classification.'0 Finally, in Missouri,
a transsexual woman named Sharon Boyd lost joint custody of her sons
and had her visiting rights severely restricted because, in part, the court
did not have "substantial evidence" that the "father's" sex reassignment
surgery would have no effect on the children's "moral development.""'
"Losses" like these affect not only the individual litigants involved but
also the thousands of other transgendered people who will never file
lawsuits, but who will continue to be discriminated against as a result of
these decisions. While interrogating the incoherence embedded in the
state's attempt to regulate the relationship between genitalia, gender
identity, and gender expression, it is also vital that we not lose track of
the material consequences of such regulation. As Robert Cover has
written, "A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result,
somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life." 12
Transsexuals, transgendered, and gender-variant people are thus
besieged on both sides. On the one hand, they are attacked by lesbian
and gay rights advocates who perceive their "gender-crossing" practices
and identities as too inauthentic, 3 dismissing them as either too politically
unfeasible a constituency for mainstream gay rights groups or too
9. Bower, supra note 4, at 274, 285 (emphasis added).
10. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
11. J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
12. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
13. A view put forward in JANICE RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE (1980). See
Sandy Stone's powerful rejoinder to Raymond's argument that transsexual women are "deviant
males" in Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto, in BODYGUARDS 280,
295-99 (Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub eds., 1991).
14. For example, Barney Frank considered transsexuals, transgendered and gender-variant
individuals too politically unfeasible to be included in the groups that would be covered under
the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act. See Frank's remarks in More on Federal
Sexual Orientation Bias Bill, FAIR EMP. PRAC. NEWSL. 83 (July 10, 1997). The Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, S. 869, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997) requires that "[a] covered
entity shall not, with respect to the employment or an employment opportunity of an
individual-(l) subject the individual to a different standard or different treatment, or otherwise
discriminate against the individual, on the basis of sexual orientation; or (2) discriminate against
the individual based on the sexual orientation of a person with whom the individual is believed
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undermining of the supposedly stable relationship between biological sex
and gender identity that much of current gay and lesbian rights strategy
rests upon. (Hence the exclusion of transgendered and transsexual
people from the politics of official recognition that seek legislative and
judicial remedies for what gay7 and lesbian rights advocates perceive as
identity-based discrimination. 5) They are simultaneously belittled by
queer theorists' readings of transgender subjectivity, which pose
transgendered people and their rights claims as interesting only insofar as
their subjectivity works to deconstruct categories, rather than as identity-
bearing subjects like "everyone else" who (also like "everyone else")
might wish to enjoy freedom from state-sponsored violence and
discrimination. Rather than challenging the categories themselves,
advocates of the rights of sexual minorities ought to have a long-term
strategy of challenging the state's prerogative to define those categories.
Let civil society-or what queer theorists call "culture"-be the sphere in
which identities are believed in, deconstructed, nurtured, undermined,
performed, and lived. 6 In the short term, however, rights advocates
ought to fight for legislation to protect all sexual minorities, including
transgendered and transsexual people.
17
The rest of this Article demonstrates why gay and lesbian rights
advocates should expand their project to include transgendered and
gender-variant people, practices, and identities. Much of this discussion
centers on the arguments that are made for and against same-sex
marriage. In the next section of the Article, I discuss the sex-based
strategy of gay and lesbian rights advocates seeking legal recognition of
same-sex marriage and some of the assumptions about sex that
accompany that strategy. Then in Part III, I examine the "same-sex
to associate or to have associated." The Act defines "sexual orientation" as "homosexuality,
bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether such orientation is real or perceived." Id.
15. Though of course what is often taken to be identity-based discrimination-the firing of
lesbians and gay men, for example-might often be, in fact, discrimination based on the
individual's gender presentation. Very butch women or effeminate men, heterosexual or
homosexual, can be subject to discrimination for their violation of hegemonic gender norms.
16. For a debate about the reproduction of cultural identifications not based on essentialist
notions, see Walter Bean Michaels, Race into Culture and The No-Drop Rule, in IDENTITIES
32, 401 (Kwame Anthiony Appiah & Henry Louis Gates eds., 1995) and the response by Avery
Gordan and Christopher Newfield, White Philosophy, in IDENTITIES, supra, at 380.
17. Recently, legislation which would include "gender identity" in anti-discrimination
laws has been proposed, and in a few cases passed. These bills attempt to protect transsexual
and transgendered, or gender-variant, individuals. An Iowa City ordinance, passed in October
1995, defines gender identity as "[a] person's various individual attributes, actual or perceived,
in behavior, practice or appearance, as they are understood to be masculine and/or feminine."
IOWA CrTy, IOWA, CrrY CODE tit. 2, § 2-2-1 (1995). Similarly, a San Francisco ordinance,
passed in December 1994, defines gender identity as "a person's various individual attributes as
they are understood to be masculine and/or feminine." SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE
art. 33, § 3303 (1994).
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marriages" that are already legal-ones that involve transsexuals-and
discuss how opponents of same-sex marriage do not make the distinction
between gay/lesbian rights and transgender rights that many gay and
lesbian rights advocates do. In Part IV, I show how the strategy of
attempting to separate gender normativity from heteronormativity does
not work for the entire constituency of sexual minorities-especially if
one does not define that constituency with the abstract concept of
homosexuality or sexual orientation-and, moreover, has serious
consequences for non-transgendered people as well.
I. Describing Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex
Discrimation
Some have argued that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation might be better described as a type of sex discrimination, 18
especially since neither the federal circuits nor the Supreme Court have
found that sexual orientation constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
and so have not required that laws discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation be subject to a higher level of judicial scrutiny. This equal
protection dead-end has led some advocates of gay and lesbian rights to
portray some types of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as
discrimination on the basis of sexual object choice, which constitutes a
type of sex discrimination 19 Basing the rights claims of lesbians and gay
men on a same-sex-object-choice definition of homosexuality appears to
be a solid tactical move, since rights claims need to be articulated in
terms that are intelligible to the judiciary. What could be more
intelligible than sexual object choice, since that choice is supposedly
premised on the biological sex of one's partner, rather than on the sexual
18. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytelling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 511 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Homosexuality and
the Constitution, METAPHILOSOP-Y, Oct. 1994. For a critique of Sunstein's argument for
same-sex marriage, see MoRRIs B. KAPLAN, SEXUAL JUSTICE 225-26 (1997).
In fact, one of the arguments made against the Equal Rights Amendment was that the ERA
would bring about homosexual marriages. See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE
ERA 128-29 (1986).
19. Recently, Judge Eugene Nickerson found the Department of Defense's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy unconstitutional, and part of his reasoning was based on the observation that
homosexuality is not defined by engaging in the practice of "sodomy," as the Department of
Defense suggests, since heterosexuals also engage in sodomy, defined as oral or anal
intercourse. Instead, he suggests, "[w]hat differentiates the class of homosexuals from that of
heterosexuals is the gender of the person's sexual partner." Able v. United States, 968 F.
Supp. 850, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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practices that the opponents of gay and lesbian rights relish describing?'
Certainly, sex is a category that seems reassuringly stable, fixed, and
knowable-unlike homosexuality itself, which opponents of lesbian and
gay rights, including the Christian right, depict as a behavior rather than
an identity.
The sexual-orientation-discrimination-as-sex-discrimination strategy
is articulated very clearly in Baehr v. Miike, the Hawaii same-sex
marriage case.2" The challengers of the ban on same-sex marriage in
Baehr have based their most successful claim thus far on an article of
Hawaii's Constitution prohibiting state-sanctioned discrimination in the
exercise of a person's civil rights on the basis of sex.' Although the
state of Hawaii attempted to argue that the plaintiffs had no right to
"enter into state-licensed homosexual marriages" because as homosexuals
they "are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class and do not require
heightened judicial solicitude,"' the majority opinion of Hawaii's
Supreme Court noted that "'[h]omosexual' and 'same-sex' marriages are
not synonymous" 24 and "it is immaterial whether the plaintiffs ... are
homosexuals." ' According to the majority's reasoning, it is the sex, not
20. A typical example of such rhetoric, in this case produced to argue in favor of
Colorado's anti-gay Amendment 2, is as follows: "What's fair about an affluent group gaining
minority privileges simply for what they do in bed?" Colorado for Family Values pamphlet,
cited in Donna Minkowitz, The Christian Right's Anti-Gay Campaign, 53 CHRISTIANrrY AND
CRISiS 99, 102 (1993).
21. For example, the plaintiffs in the Hawaii same-sex marriage case argue that the most
direct impact of the Hawaii marriage statute is that "the limitation imposed by the statute is
exclusively sex-based (all that is asked by the Director is the sex of the applicants),
notwithstanding that this also has the effect of prohibiting marriages into which some people
seek to enter because of their sexual orientation." Plaintiff-Appellees' Answering Brief at 18,
Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996).
22. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or
ancestry." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5F. The Hawaii Supreme Court has so far found in favor of
the plaintiffs. Finding sex a suspect category under the terms of the Hawaiian constitution, the
court ruled that, unless the state of Hawaii can demonstrate that the marriage statute in question
is justified by a compelling state interest, it is unconstitutional. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,
67 (Haw. 1993).
23. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51, 52.
24. Id. at 52, n.l1. The opinion continues: "[B]y the same token, a 'heterosexual' same-
sex marriage is, in theory, not oxymoronic. A 'homosexual' person is defined as '[olne
sexually attracted to another of the same sex.' Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 839
(16th ed. 1989). 'Homosexuality' is 'sexual desire or behavior directed toward a person or
person's of one's own sex.' Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English
Language 680 (1989).... Parties to a 'union between a man and a woman' may or may not be
homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or
heterosexuals." Id.
25. Id. at 58 n.17.
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the sexual orientation, of the marriage license applicants that is at issue,
and, absent a compelling state interest, refusing marriages licenses to
applicants of the same sex is unconstitutional under the Hawaiian
constitution. Such a sex-based approach ends the reliance of gay and
lesbian rights advocates on the difficult suspect class argument, which
involves trying to prove that homosexuality constitutes an immutable
characteristic and thus a fixed identity in itself, rather than merely a
behavior or set of practices.' Instead, the more discrete, already quasi-
suspect, and presumably fixed category of sex becomes the operative
identity in this civil rights claim. Hence, it is not the homosexuality of
the plaintiffs that is at issue but, rather, the sex of their partners. Figured
this way, many, though not all,27 homosexual rights claims boil down to
sex. Mark Fajer observes:
Unlike the suspect class argument, a gender-based equal protection
argument avoids the immutability controversy. While immutability is
not a litmus test for heightened scrutiny, courts and commentators
discussing classifications based on sexual orientation generally seem to
rely heavily on it. Many who support heightened scrutiny argue that
sexual orientation is immutable; some who reject heightened scrutiny
argue it is not. Because mutability is a difficult issue, gay advocates are
better off avoiding it if possible. To the extent the gender-based
argument rests on immutability, it is the immutability of gender, not of
orientation.'
Certainly, the "common sense" knowledge of sex produces a
narrative in which biological sex is immutable, is limited to two
categories, and is determined by the body-and in which gender,
although socially constructed, is produced in a predictable relation to sex.
This model posits that the sex assigned to the infant at birth by a doctor's
visual check of the genitalia will accurately predict the child's gender
identity or, otherwise stated, the child's sense of being male or female.
As Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna have noted, "Gender
attribution is, for the most part, genital attribution."2 9 In turn, this model
assumes that the child's gender identity will cause the child to begin to
organize "his" or "her" behavior to conform to either masculine or
feminine patterns of presentation. This developmental milestone is
variously described as social sex role, gender behavior, or gender
26. See Paisley Currah, Searching for Immutability: Homosexuality, Race, and Rights
Discourse, in A SIMPLE MATTER OF JUSTICE (Angelia R. Wilson ed., 1994).
27. There are some very significant exceptions, including discrimination in employment
related to gender presentation, expression, or role. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989) and Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).
28. Fajer, supra note 18, at 648-49 (footnotes omitted).
29. SUZANNE KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNO-METHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 11 (1978).
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expression."0 Although a few psychologists are beginning to challenge
this model, 3' most do not.32 In the larger social field in which civil rights
arguments are made, this model dominates, operating not merely as a
description of childhood development but as a normative standard of
correctness, representing how things ought to be arranged.
Before homosexuality was removed from the American Psychiatric
Association's list of mental disorders in 1973, in the U.S. this model of
sexuality posited a fourth developmental achievement-heterosexuality.
The entire process, then, went like this: Infants designated as male
become aware of themselves as boys, learn to act masculine, and develop
a heterosexual sexual orientation; infants designated by doctors as female
at birth learn to label themselves as girls during early childhood, later
present feminine behavior, and eventually develop a sexual attraction
toward the opposite sex.
Opponents of the rights of lesbian and gay people still hold dear the
model that construes heterosexuality as the normative endpoint of mature
human sexuality. Conversely, advocates of gay and lesbian rights affirm
that heterosexuality, bisexuality, and homosexuality are equally healthy
avenues of development. In an article entitled, How to Bring Your Kids
Up Gay, Eve Sedgwick points out that the elimination of the diagnosis of
homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual in 1973 was followed a few years later with the
introduction of a new pathology, "Gender Identity Disorder of
Childhood," which pathologizes effeminate boys and overly-masculine
girls.33 Thus, as Sedgwick notes, homosexuality, defined in terms of
30. For a review of the psychological literature on gender identity, see Deborah E.S.
Frable, Gender, Racial, Ethnic, Sexual, and Class Identities, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 139
(1997). As Anne Bolin suggests, transsexuals skew the entire determinist schematic: "As a
social identity, transsexualism posits the analytic independence of the four gender markers-sex,
gender identity, gender role or social identity (including behaviors and appearance) and sexual
orientation-that are embedded in the Western gender schema as taken-for-granted premises and
regarded in a number of scientific discourses as 'naturally' linked." Anne Bolin, Transcending
and Transgendering, in THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER 447, 459 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1996).
31. Most notably SANDRA LIPSITz BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE
DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY (1993).
32. See Shannon Minter, Diagnosis and Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder in Children
(February 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
33. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, in FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET 69-71 (Michael Warner ed., 1993) [hereinafter FEAR OF A QUEER PLANEr]. In fact,
although the American Psychiatric Association agreed to remove homosexuality from its list of
mental disorders in 1973, the next complete edition of their Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM 11) was not published until 1980-the first edition to include the "Gender Identity
Disorder" diagnosis. Id.
As Shannon Minter has pointed out, the psychiatric diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder
has provided needed cover to psychologists and psychiatrists to treat pre-homosexual, or pre-
transsexual children; indeed, he notes, "the great majority of children treated for GID grow up
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same-sex object choice, is uncoupled from the new pathology, which
posits that healthy boys and girls exhibit a "core gender identity"
consonant with their biological sex.34 Of course, as Sedgwick observes,
"[o]ne serious problem with this way of distinguishing between gender
and sexuality is that, while denaturalizing sexual object-choice, it
radically renaturalizes gender.""
The problem with "renaturalizing gender" is that the category of
biological sex is fraught with indeterminacy." Apart from visible
genitals, other physiological components of gender include hormones,
chromosomes, and internal reproductive organs. As Anne Bolin notes,
"the more scientific and complex the determinants of biological sex
become, the less they can be relied on to indicate gender. 37 A strategy
that is based on sex and essentialist notions of gender, then, is ultimately
unmoored-not only for transgendered people, but for non-transgendered
people as well. Rather than assuming that the immutability of sex is
unchallenged such that gender identity and gender expression exists in an
unmediated and predictable relation to one's physiology, the agenda-
setting rights advocates of sexual minorities would do well to attend to
the works of Mary Ann Case, Katherine Franke, and Francisco Valdes,
which demonstrate some of the consequences of the legal applications of
these categories.38
11. Legal Same-Sex Marriages
Because individual state marriage statutes and the case law
interpreting them ultimately refer to sex and not gender identity, the fight
for same-sex marriage that currently preoccupies the mainstream gay and
lesbian rights movement constitutes a demand that states marry
individuals of, "literally," the same sex. As will be discussed below,
because states define sex and its relation to gender differently, this
to be lesbian, gay, or bisexual." Minter, supra note 32. See also Katherine K. Wilson, Gender
as Illness: Issues of Psychiatric Classification, (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Statement on Gender Identity Disorder and Transgender
People (Dec. 11, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
34. See Sedgwick, supra note 33, at 73.
35. Id.
36. See ANNA FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER (2d ed. 1992).
37. Bolin, supra note 30, at 453.
38. For a discussion of much of the contradictory caselaw on sex and gender identity,
including cases involving transsexuals, see Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1995).
For a detailed examination of the "conflation" between sex, gender, and sexual orientation, see
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
-Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1995). See also Case, supra note 27, at 46-49, for a discussion of Title VII and
effeminate men.
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ambiguity often poses problems for transsexuals-whether they be
heterosexual or homosexual, pre-operative, post-operative, or non-
operative. If individuals of the same "sex" were allowed to marry,
transsexuals would no longer be at a disadvantage. Transsexuals who
had previously wished to marry someone of the opposite gender, but
were denied because of the vagaries of the laws of the particular state that
issued their birth certificate, would then be eligible to marry the object of
their desire. This would be construed as a same-"sex" marriage. 39
Although the legalization of marriages involving transsexuals would
certainly be a positive outcome, some of the arguments invoked in favor
of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage paradoxically have negative
consequences for transgendered and gender-variant people, both children
and adults. Specifically, the mainstream gay and lesbian rights'
community's same-sex marriage strategy relies on arguments that
reproduce both the hegemony of gender conformity and the notion that
there is a stable relationship between biological sex, gender identity and
gender expression.
As the "freedom to marry" challenge engineered by mainstream
lesbian and gay rights advocates gains momentum, it is important to
recognize that "same-sex" marriage is already legal, or, more precisely,
that many states have been unable to successfully regulate marriages
between those whose sexual identity, gender identity, or even sexual
orientation confounds the predictable relationship assumed by state law to
exist between sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation. For example,
when Lori Buckwalter, a male-to-female transsexual who had been taking
hormones for about a year, announced that she was going to marry her
female lover before officially requesting a certificate indicating her sex
had been changed, she was also announcing the first public marriage of a
"homosexual" couple in Oregon. 40 This officially sanctioned homosexual
marriage resulted from the disjunction between her gender identity and
the law's assignment of her gender. In Ms. Buckwalter's eyes, as a
woman who marries the object of her desire, another woman, the
marriage is a homosexual one. At the moment of the marriage, however,
the legal categories of the state define Ms. Buckwalter as a male,
therefore the marriage-while a same-gender one-is nevertheless
sanctioned by the state as an opposite-sex marriage. When Ms.
39. Despite the legal, conceptual, and political nexus between the fight for legal
recognition of lesbian and gay same-sex marriages and transsexual marriages (some of which
are same-sex, some of which are same-gender, some of which are homosexual, and some of
which are heterosexual), there is a paucity of academic work on the connection, except for
Mary Coomb's excellent article, Transgenderism and Sexual Orientation: More than a
Marriage of Covenience (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
40. See Man Planning Sex Change Will Many Woman, BULL. (Bend, Or.), Dec. 15,
1996, at B8.
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Buckwalter formally has her gender identity changed, however, and the
state officially recognizes her as a woman, she will already be married to
another woman-thus resulting in a legal same-sex marriage. Ms.
Buckwalter is able to take advantage of the incoherence of the state's
marriage laws-that designate marriage as a union between a man and a
woman and attribute gender based on visible-genital-sexual
characteristics-and marry her lover, a woman, before her sex
reassignment surgery. Of course, since her gender identity, and that of
her partner, is female, she already had a same-gender marriage before
undergoing sex reassignment surgery.
These marriage plans reveal the contradictions inherent in legislating
the supposedly natural, organic, and immutable correspondence between
the anatomical sex given at birth and gender identity, and the universality
and normativity of opposite-sex desire. Her plan to marry before
undergoing surgery confounds the state's attempt to define the relations
between gender identity, anatomical sex, sexual orientation, and
sexuality. In Oregon, marriage is entered into by "a male" and "a
female. " 41 Oregon's laws on the official designation of gender mark
surgery as the moment that sex reassignment is completed. (The medical
establishment's emphasis on the completion of sex reassignment surgery as
the moment of transition from one sex to another poses particular problems
for female-to-male transsexuals, since the high cost of the "bottom"
surgery is often prohibitive.)
Oregon's case law on defining sex, however, is not the final word
on that subject since, for the purpose of marriage, the power to define
sex is left to the states-a power the recently passed Defense of Marriage
Act does not undermine.42 As the late transgender-legal-rights advocate
Dee McKellar pointed out, some contradictions arise in comparing
statutes and case law across states:
In Ohio, which will not correct a birth certificate, a post-op TS can
marry someone with similar genitals. In Oregon, a pre-op TS can
marry someone with complementary genitals. In Texas, a non-op with
court-ordered gender correction can marry a person with similar
41. OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (1995) ("Marriage is a civil contract entered into in person
by males at least 17 years of age and females at least 17 years of age, who are otherwise
capable, and solemnized in accordance with ORS 106.150.").
42. The Defense of Marriage Act declares that no state "shall be required to give effect to
any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other States." 28 U.S.C. § 1738c. The Defense of Marriage Act did not,
however, attempt to define sex.
August 1997] DEFENDING GENDERS
genitals by showing a driver's license, or can show a passport and
marry someone with complementary genitals.43
Generally, the most important instrument for the purposes of marriage
is one's birth certificate. Currently, only fifteen states allow post-operative
transsexuals to change their birth certificates. Individual states have
different statutes and caselaw on amending of birth certificates, resulting
in the patchwork situations described above. Some states, such as
Arizona, have statutes which allow for the issuance of new birth
certificates, while others, such as Colorado, have statutes which allow for
the amendment of original birth certificates.' Conversely, other states,
such as Tennessee, have statutes explicitly prohibiting the retroactive
changing of birth certificates45 or, as in the case of Oregon and Ohio,
have caselaw prohibiting the legal recognition of sex changes. 46 Since the
state of Ohio will not allow the legal designation of sex to come into
congruence with an individual's gender identity after sex reassignment
surgery, it is perfectly possible for either a pre-operative or a post-
operative transsexual woman from Ohio to marry another woman there.47
Conversely, it is not possible for a post-operative transsexual woman to
marry a man in that state. And in Oregon, because that state refuses to
recognize Lori Buckwalter's female gender identity, Ms. Buckwalter is
able to marry her woman lover before she undergoes sex reassignment
surgery.
43. Electronic mail from Dee McKellar (May 3, 1997) (on file with author). See also
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, A TRANSGENDERED PARENT'S LEGAL GUIDE TO
CHILD CUSTODY (on file with author).
44. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 43 (manuscript at 44, 47, on file
with author).
45. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 68-3-203 (1997). ("The sex of an individual will not be
changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.").
46. See K. v. Health Div., 552 P.2d 840 (1976). An Ohio court, ruling on "whether a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual is permitted under Ohio law to marry a male," found
that "[tihere was no evidence that [Elaine Ladrach] at birth had any physical characteristics
other than those of a male and he was thus correctly designated 'Boy' on his birth certificate.
There was also no laboratory documentation that the applicant had other than male
chromosomes." In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio 1987) (citing the English case
Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306, 1323 (P. 1970), holding that the assignment of gender at
birth becomes the person's "true sex," which sex reassignment surgery cannot change).
47. See Patrick O'Donnell, He Plans to Become a Woman Shortly After Marriage, HOUS.
CHRON., Oct. 6, 1986, at 7 (describing Ohio native Denise Smith's plan to marry her fiancde
Debi Easterday and then begin a male-to-female sex change procedure). In In re Ladrach, 513
N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio 1987), an Ohio court upheld the refusal of a marriage license to a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual and a man.
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I. Gender Normativity, Heteronormativity, and the
Reproduction of Culture(s)
The ontological chaos revealed in Oregon's laws on marriage, sex,
and gender identity is made even clearer by the response of those
opposing Ms. Buckwalter's marriage. Upon hearing about her marriage
plans, Lon Mabon, the leader of Oregon Citizens Alliance, announced he
would immediately begin organizing a voter referendum that would
define marriage as a strictly heterosexual institution and gender as
something determined at conception. "It stops this playing around with
Mother Nature," Mabon said.45 The Christian right's attempt to defend
traditional notions about the relation between genitals and gender identity
by possibly resorting to a state-wide referendum exposes the futility of
such an essentialist gesture-which Mabon admits when he decides to put
the relation between gender identity and anatomy up to a vote. Not only
does Lon Mabon want to enshrine forever the relation between gender
identity and anatomy, he also wishes to define the moment when that
relationship is secured as the moment of conception, which would make it
impossible for transsexuals to change their gender identity legally to
match sex reassignment therapy or surgery.
While the Christian right attempts to defend traditional Western
notions about the correct relation between anatomy and gender identity by
seeking recourse in a majoritarian vote, Ms. Buckwalter and her supporters
enunciate their rights claims in the language of classical Millian liberalism:
"It allows me to be who I am" and "others' judgment of you shouldn't stop
you," she argues.49 In defense of both her transition and Ms. Buckwalter
and her partner's wish to be the first homosexual couple in Oregon to be
officially married, Ms. Buckwalter invokes a coherent and imminently
rational constellation of conventions that resonates strongly with U.S.
political vernacular-the language of liberal, individualist rights. She and
her family deny her community the right to legislate her gender identity.
Of course, gender transitivity is not the only problem that the
Oregon Citizen's Alliance sees in this pre-op transsexual marriage.
48. Man Planning Sex Change Will Many Woman, supra note 40, at B8.
Other spokespeople for organizations associated with the Christian right also make explicit
connections between same-sex and transsexual marriages. For example, Andrea Sheldon, of the
Traditional Values Coalition, responded to a comment about same-sex marriages by suggesting,
"I don't believe it stops there .... I think the American people really need to
understand what is going on. This is an attempt to legitimize their lifestyle. Their
behavior-based lifestyle. You want to grant marriages to transgendered people. What
does that mean-Jim marries Suzy one day, leaves her, gets a sex-change, marries
Jim-it's very, very confusing."
Interview aired on CNN Today (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 4, 1996).
49. Man Planning Sex Change Will Many Woman, supra note 40, at B8.
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Mabon and other opponents of same-sex marriage claim that the state
must never officially sanction same-sex marriage for the simple reason
that these unions would strike a death blow to the core values of Western
culture. The problem, quite simply, is that culture, or at least what is
best about "our" culture, would not be reproduced if the state were to
recognize same-sex marriages. For example, a member of Congress
supporting the Defense of Marriage Act argued:
We live in a free country... precisely because we have standards,
because our society has successfully socialized most Americans in the
values of love, charity, and tolerance; and the institution on which we
depend to socialize these values is the institution of marriage. Those
who oppose [DOMA] are either seeking no standards or a standard
vastly different from that sanctioned by millennia of tradition, the
teachings of all the monotheistic religions, and in particular, the
teachings of Judeo-Christian religion on which our culture is based.50
Indeed, reproducing culture figures as a recurring motif in these
discussions against "gay marriage." Opponents of same-sex marriage do
understand that gender, or, more precisely, gender identity, is not
literally reproduced through the body, but through cultural mechanisms.
It is because the link between assigned biological sex and gender identity
and expression is not secured by "nature" that they so vociferously favor
securing that link by law-despite the discursive and physical violence
that such state intervention entails.
How exactly is it that same-sex marriage would fail to reproduce the
"greatness" of American culture? According to the arguments put
forward by the opponents of same-sex marriage, it is by failing to raise
children with a firm sense of the "correct" gender identity-one that
conforms to the gender assigned to them on the basis of their genitalia-
that same-sex marriages would fail to reproduce what is good about
(hegemonic) American culture. Thus, one of the arguments put forward
by opponents of same-sex marriage in Hawaii addresses the gender
identity of the children raised in same-sex households. For example, the
minority members of the State of Hawaii's Commission on Sexual
Orientation and the Law (arguing against same-sex marriage) cite
testimony asserting that:
50. 141 CONG. REc. H1346 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Talent).
Queer theorists use the term heteronormativity to describe ideologies that posit
heterosexuality as exclusive and central to the reproduction of culture. MICHAEL WARNER,
Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET, supra note 33, at vii, xxi. The point about queer
theory's interrogations of heteronormativity, of course, is that it is not heterosexual identities
and practices themselves that must be undermined; rather, the point is to critique the normative
status ascribed to heterosexual identities, institutions, and practices, to get rid of the "ought to"
that simultaneously legitimizes heterosexuality and thus necessarily casts homosexual identities
and practices as other, as abnormal, as deviant. Of course, such a project undermines the very
categories themselves, over time.
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One of the most fundamental functions of parenting is to evoke,
develop, and reinforce gender identity and then proceed to shepherd.
the developing child in such a way as to bring his psychological side
into harmony with his biological side, and thereby develop a solid
sense of maleness or femaleness. 1
And,
[A] child should be brought up with a mother and a father, in order to
develop appropriate gender-defined self identity.52
And, finally,
We must fight back against the social movements which are destructive
to our ways of life .... This means, above all, preventing the passage
of laws which ignore the differences between a male and a female, and
which undermine the security and stability of the family and the
nation.53
In these debates, it is assumed that the institution of heterosexual
marriage functions to reproduce traditional gender roles, arrangements,
and identities. To prove this claim, opponents of same-sex marriage cite
evidence that purports to show that children raised in same-sex house-
holds have difficulties developing a gender identity consonant with their
assigned gender.54 It is important to note that in these discussions of chil-
dren-in same-sex marriage as well as in adoption and custody case
law-it is not merely the potential of the children raised in such
households to become homosexual that is explicitly under discussion; in
addition, the development of the children's gender identity is also
problematized, often more explicitly. But, as Shannon Minter has point-
ed out, gender identity problems in youth are invariably yoked to the
specter of homosexuality, or "pre-homosexual conditions."'
Certainly, the ideologues of the Christian right work hard to
associate gender identity disorder with homosexuality. For example,
Robert Knight, of the Family Research Council, argues:
[C]hildren really do need a mother and a father. A little boy needs to
have a father to learn what it is to be a man and to have his growing
masculinity affirmed, and he needs to have a mother for that mother
love, and to watch both parents interact and see how men should treat
women, women should treat men, how they both treat each other as
51. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, 18th Leg., Ch. 5,
Pt. I, at 16 (Haw. 1995) (statement of Dr. Harold M. Voth).
52. Id. at 14.
53. Id. at 16-17.
54. For example, the defendant in Baehr presented testimony asserting that "same-sex
relationships do not provide the same type of learning model or experience for children as does
male-female parenting, because there is an overabundance of information about one gender and
little information about the other gender." Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Dec. 3, 1996)
(findings of fact and conclusions of law).
55. Minter, supra note 32.
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husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, and their relationship with
their children.56
For Knight, inculcating heterosexuality goes part and parcel with
establishing a gender identity that conforms to gender norms-learning
masculinity, for example, is also learning heterosexuality. So gender
normativity-the belief that gender ought to be organized according to
traditional and firmly established gender identities, practices, and
arrangements-assumes heteronormativity.
Since the crux of the argument against same-sex marriage lies in the
linkages of heteronormativity with gender normativity and dysphoric
gender identity with homosexuality, gay and lesbian advocates for same-
sex marriage have responded by reasserting the distinctions between the
above concepts. They cite evidence to prove, first, that children raised
by same-sex couples or by single lesbians or gay men are not more likely
to become gay or lesbian than children raised in opposite-sex households,
and, second, that the gender identity of children raised in such
households is no "less normal" than that of children raised in opposite-
sex households.57 However, basing arguments for same-sex marriage
(and custody and adoption by same-sex couples) on data that suggest that
children raised in lesbian and gay households are no "less normal" than
children raised in heterosexual households-in terms of their gender
identity and sexual orientation-means that the heteronormative aspects of
the institution of marriage are challenged by resorting to an argument that
suggests that the production of gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered
children in a same-sex household would be a bad thing. Such an
argument ultimately does little to seriously undermine either the hetero
norms or the gender norms implicit (and explicit) in homophobic and
transphobic arguments about the reproduction of American greatness.
The separation of sexual orientation from gender variance,
transgenderism, and transsexualism reinforces the idea that gender
identity has a stable and predictable relation to the gender assigned at
birth on inspection of the visible genitals, which ought not to be changed.
We can see now that this disjunction between sexual orientation and
56. Straight Talk from the Family Research Council: Same-Sex Marriage? (National
Empowerment Television broadcast, Apr. 10, 1996).
57. For example, in a custody case involving a lesbian mother, Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund argued, "The presence of a lesbian or gay parent or a same-sex couple in the
home has no adverse effect on the moral or sexual development of children." Second Amended
Brief of Amicus Curiae The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of
Appellant at 19, Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4184, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 9130 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Aug. 30, 1996). This is not a difficult argument to make because the claim that same-sex
couples will be more likely to raise children with a "weak" gender identity or who grow up to
be gay or lesbian has not been borne out by the research. See, e.g., C. PATrERsON, Lesbian
and Gay Parents and Their Children, in THE LivEs OF LESBIANS, GAYS, AND BISExUALS 274
(Rich Savin-Williams & Kenneth Cohen eds., 1996).
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gender nonconformity is premised on the idea that gays and lesbians are
defined by same-sex desire, which in turn is premised on the notion that
sex and gender identity are static, fixed and intransitive. In the case of
gays and lesbians, then, one is the same as one's object of desire. But
what exactly is it that is the same? Visible genitals? Internal
reproductive organs? Chromosomes? Hormones? Gender identity?
And what if one of the above variables is not the same as that of one's
lover?
No doubt basing rights claims on a definition of sexual orientation as
constituted by same-sex object choice has the advantage of analytical
clarity. But that analytical clarity loses its usefulness when it is forced to
apply to particular histories, practices, cultures, and social formations-in
short, to the lived experiences of sexual minorities. As the work
produced in queer history has pointed out, particular historical
configurations around sex, gender identity expression, and sexuality
cannot be contained by an invocation of ahistorical categories that do not
take the variability of forms of gender expression into account. For
example, in his study of gay life in New York in the first half of this
century, George Chauncey points out:
[I1n important respects the hetero-homosexual binarism, the sexual
regime now hegemonic in American culture, is a stunningly recent
creation. Particularly in working-class culture, homosexual behavior
per se became the primary basis for the labeling and self-identification
of men as 'queer' only around the middle of the twentieth century;
before then, most men were so labeled only if they displayed a much
broader inversion of their ascribed gender status by assuming the sexual
and other cultural roles ascribed to women. 8
There are-and have been-many queer communities and cultures
that do engage in practices that undermine traditional gender norms, that
do constitute a kind of queerness that is not at all described by the notion
of same-sex desire. When the mainstream gay and lesbian rights
community's strategies for equality leave intact the state's authority to
regulate the relation between genitals and gender identity, the result is a
narrow victory-one that keeps the analytical category of sexual
orientation pure at the expense of those whose anatomy, gender identity,
and gender expression are not linked the way the hegemonic culture
would wish.
58. GEORGE CHAUNcEY, GAY NEW YORK 13 (1994). Davis and Kennedy's history of
lesbian communities in Buffalo from the mid-1930s to the early 1960s has also unearthed a
more complicated relation to gender identity and gender expression exhibited in some of the
lesbian communities they studied. See ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D.
DAVIs, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY
(1993).
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While "homosexuality" in particular and sexual orientation in
general, defined abstractly as constituted by sexual object choice, has
been an important conceptual tool in furthering the rights claims of gay
men and lesbians in the heyday of the new social movements and the
ascendancy of identity politics, perhaps it is time to reconsider how
extensively it ought to be invoked to further the civil rights strategies of
the divergent sets of identities, practices, and orientations designated by
the term "sexual minority." Since the very concept of homosexuality is
complicit in reinscribing the hegemonic sex/gender system, it does little
to further the interests of those sexual minorities who are gender-variant
and/or transsexual. Clearly, the fight for same-sex marriage is an
important one-for lesbians, for bisexuals, for gay men, and for those
transsexuals (straight and gay) who are now unable to get married.
However, the more radical project, and one that could run alongside the
reformist one, is to argue against the state's right to classify in the first
place. Kimberl6 Crenshaw has reminded us that Plessy v. Ferguson was
not merely an identity-based challenge to the doctrine of separate but
equal. She notes:
At issue were multiple dimensions of domination, including catego-
rization, the sign of race, and the subordination of those so labeled.
There were at least two targets for Plessy to challenge: the construction
of identity ("What is a Black?"), and the system of subordination based
on that identity ("Can Blacks and whites sit together on a train?").
Plessy actually made both arguments, one against the coherence of race
as a category, the other against the subordination of those deemed to be
Black.59
This clash of constituencies, between mainstream lesbian and gay
rights advocates and the gender community, is not as clear-cut as many
assume. One constituency, queer and transgendered youth, blurs this
distinction.' While gay and lesbian rights advocates fight for equal
rights, children and adolescents exhibiting gender-variant behavior can be
pathologized, treated, and in some cases institutionalized for gender
identity disorder to cure them of their pre-homosexual or pre-transsexual
conditions. One of the leading proponents of the treatment of Gender
Identity Disorder in Childhood, George Rekers, made this connection
quite clearly at a recent conservative conference on homosexuality:
Rekers said lesbians tend to be tomboys in childhood, identify too
closely with their fathers, prefer to play with "masculine" toys and
demonstrate a "distinct dislike for doll play and various other female
activities." Male homosexuals, Rekers said, "report the opposite
pattern," preferring the company of girls and wanting to wear lipstick
59. Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1297-98.
60. See Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the Fantasy that
Gay andLesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 269 (1996).
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and dresses. Rekers characterized both behaviors as "gender dis-
turbances" that can be corrected through 18 to 22 months of weekly
therapy during childhood and adolescence.61
Returning to the reproduction of sex, sexual orientation, and gender
transitivity, there is a bit of a free rider problem going on here. Gender-
variant behavior, homosexuality, and transgenderism-while clearly not
reproduced primarily in the family as the Christian right and other
opponents of same-sex marriage assume-does have to get reproduced
somewhere. Launching arguments that reinforce gender norms into that
discursive space of the media, broadly construed-which is the actual
battleground for the rights claims of gender minorities-plays into the
ongoing conservative assaults on minority gender transitive traditions.
Instead, we ought to give sustenance to gender-variant traditions to
preserve them and ensure their reproduction, instead of playing into the
larger ideological erasure of them. We need to contest rather than
support ideologies that assert that queer, gay, lesbian, bisexual,
questioning, and transgendered kids are pathological, and that ultimately
reinforce heteronormative notions.' Putting too much time and energy
into making arguments that are implicitly premised on the dominant
gender norms (and their relationship to anatomy) merely because they are
intelligible in the terms of the state's legal categories might mean that we
ignore the larger project of transforming just what is intelligible.
Suggesting that sexual orientation and gender non-conformity are
entirely separate issues skirts the problem, however. The right wing,
much of the "general public," and many members of the judiciary do see
a link between sexual orientation and gender non-conformity. Moreover,
lesbians and gay men, even gender-conforming lesbians and gay men, do
suffer material consequences from that link, most notably in cases
involving child custody, as the following examples demonstrate.
In Illinois, a court restricted a lesbian mother's visitation with her
son, finding that the child has a "gender identity problem" and that
"there is no strong evidence ... that the [lesbian mother] will be more
discreet in terms of her exposition of her gay lifestyle in the child's
presence, and notwithstanding the child's gender identification problem,
61. Carolyn Lochhead, Conservatives Brand Homosexuality a 'Tragic Affliction,' S.F.
CHRON., Jun. 20, 1997, at A4. Rekers advocates the use of aversion therapy in this treatment.
62. In arguing against legal discrimination against homosexuals, Stephen Macedo suggests
that it may be a good idea to transmit heteronormative ideology to children: "It is not
completely unreasonable to regard heterosexuality as preferable to homosexuality. There may
even be a 'wavering child' to whom this information is important." Stephen Macedo,
Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 292 (1995).
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which she learned in 1987, [she] took the child to a gay-lesbian
parade."63
In Louisiana, a lesbian mother lost joint custody because of concerns
about gender identity. The court cited the trial testimony of a
psychologist at length:
Q. Dr. L'Herisson, I will ask you to assume that you have a situation
with a two year old son whose parents recently separated and is residing
with his mother. And further assuming his mother is occupying a
bedroom with another woman behind a closed door, would that situation
create any problems in your professional opinion that might be harmful
to the welfare of that two year old child?
A. A two year old child is at a stage of development where they are
forming a gender identity and learning sex appropriate roles for their
own sex, whatever, masculine and female rolls [sic]. It's preferable
that they have good roll [sic] models in a stable environment always. I
would be concerned if the role models were confused so that a child
would not understand or know that this was not typical or usual or to be
expected. 64
The court concluded that, "where the sexual preference is known
and openly admitted, where there have been open, indiscreet displays of
affection beyond mere friendship and where the child is of an age where
gender identity is being formed, the joint custody arrangement should
award greater custodial time to the father."6
In New Jersey, an appellate court permitted a second-parent
adoption by the same-sex partner of the natural mother, noting with
approval that "[e]ach child has a bedroom beautifully decorated in
appropriate childhood motifs with M. having a feminine design and Z. a
63. Post-decree ruling, quoted in Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990). This order was reversed by the appellate court, which found that "there is no
evidence that Jimmie has a gender identity problem." Id. at 641. However the higher court's
ruling did not dispute the logic behind the earlier ruling-that the existence of a "gender identity
problem" would indicate that the mother's lesbian lifestyle had a detrimental effect on the child.
Instead, the higher court disputed the finding that the child in question had such a "problem."
Id.
64. Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
In another case in Louisiana, an appellate court affirmed a trial court's decision to take
away primary custody from a lesbian mother because, in part, of the assumption that the
formation of the boys' gender identity would be affected by the witnessing of open displays of
"sexually charged" affection between two women. "Robin... argues that.., the displays of
affection between herself and Karri do not exceed the bounds of friendship, and that formation
of the boys' gender identity will not be affected .... Robin asserts that she should not be
denied custody because of her admitted homosexuality. We cannot agree." Scott v. Scott, 665
So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
65. Lundin, 563 So. 2d at 1277.
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masculine design" and that "[bloth parents want the children to have
good self-esteem and a good sense of gender identity. " '
Finally, there is the case of Mary Ward, a lesbian who lost custody
of her child to an ex-husband who had been convicted of murdering a
previous wife. The trial judge did not rule that Mary Ward's sexual
orientation per se meant she would lose custody, but rather considered
the effects on the child of living in a lesbian household. One of the
"facts" that figured largely in the trial court's decision against Mary
Ward was that her 11-year-old girl was forgoing age-appropriate
behavior such as wearing women's perfume, and "preferred instead to
wear men's cologne." 67 There may not have been any causal relationship
between Mary Ward's same-sex desire and her daughter's supposed
gender non-conformity. But the appropriate response of gay and lesbian
rights advocates to such a determination is not to reassert a distinction
between sexual orientation and gender non-conformity, but to challenge
the very notion that there is something wrong with "girls" who act like
"boys," with children assigned at birth as female who identify as boys, or
with children who want to change their sex. In challenging the sex-based
classifications so embedded in so much discrimination against gays,
lesbians, bisexuals, queer, and transgendered people, it is vital that we
get to the root of the problem and challenge the very premises of the
classification system itself.
66. In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995).
67. Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4184, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 9130, at *4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 1996).
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